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Difference feminism and modern citizenship
—A critical review of feminists’ debates on sexual difference—
TAKEDA Chinatsu
 The 1980s and 1990s have seen a rising public interest in ‘cultural 
pluralism’ in Western democracies. This concept assumes that speciﬁc needs of 
particular social groups, ethnic minorities, women, religious groups and 
homosexuals, for example, have not been adequately addressed within 
traditional party politics.1) Within this intellectual framework, how to ensure 
‘political equality’ of different social groups has come to constitute a 
mainstream political agenda.2) Paying particular attention to internal differences 
within a given society ﬁts into the post-modern and post-structural logic which 
attacks universalizing models of modernization theories and emphasizes 
instead the particular. 
 Feminists of the 1990s follow this global shift towards micro-level 
analysis and are aware of what makes women different. This is a major change 
from earlier feminists of the 1960s and 1970s who emphasized the sameness 
between men and women: certain difference feminists went so far as to afﬁrm 
that there is such thing as female innate nature. Other more moderate 
difference feminists afﬁrmed difference between men and women in order to 
achieve substantial equality since they observed that formal and legal equality 
did not eliminate daily inequality in socio-economic terms as well as in the 
private sphere. 
 Thus, the debate about how to achieve cultural pluralism came to focus 
upon a way of increasing substantial equality among individuals by taking into 
account their cultural and social particularities. In this light, this debate is in 
line with modern democracies’ continuous effort to search for an appropriate 
definition of citizenship and to ensure a basic human equality among all 
members of a community.3) From this point of view, how do feminist’s 
difference debates contribute to our better understanding of citizenship? And 
how do they inﬂuence our reﬂections on modern democracy? 
 This essay suggests how feminists’ debates on sexual difference 
contribute to modern democracy from the point of view of gender relations. 
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Firstly, by going over various claims of feminists upon the sexual difference, I 
will suggest that a dichotomy between sameness to and difference from a male 
norm of citizenship inherent to the debates on sexual difference was not 
adequate to achieve substantial equality between the two sexes. Is a moral 
disposition independent of any gender implication possible, then? From this 
point of view, secondly, I will deal with difference feminists’ criticism on 
gender-biased moral theories including Okin’s critical interpretation of Rawl’s 
‘theory of justice’. I will present Okin’s view that a gender-neutral deﬁnition of 
citizenship inspired by Rawls’s deﬁnition of the original position’ is applicable 
to the family institution itself in order to form citizens free from gender bias. 
(1) What is difference feminism?
 Certain feminists of the 90s emphasize difference more than sameness 
between the two sexes. However, difference does not have a monolithic 
meaning for various difference feminist schools. This section will focus upon 
three types of difference, namely, sexual difference, differences among women 
and instability in female self and study how difference feminist schools position 
themselves with respect to these categories.4)
 Women’s difference from men was first recognised among cultural 
feminists whose positions can be defined in terms of beliefs, characters and 
contexts reserved for women.5) J. Evans divides cultural feminists into strong 
and weak cultural feminists. For strong cultural feminists, the task of feminists 
is to perceive the ahistoricity of femaleness and revalue female characteristics 
like motherhood and nature. Weak cultural feminism differs so far as it assumes 
that female qualities can be upheld by men and women equally and considers 
that traditional female virtues such as nurturing and caring attitudes might 
contribute to improve society as a whole. In contrast, strong cultural feminists 
refuse any kind of fusion with male culture, insisting upon the absolute 
superiority of female nature.6)
 Gilligan’s ‘ethic of care’, women’s proper morality developed out of care 
and responsibility within personal relationships constitutes a philosophical 
backbone of cultural feminism. In addition, some American feminists who have 
long been liberal now support cultural feminism to some extent. For example, 
Friedan supports gender-speciﬁc laws for pregnant women although she does 
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not seek to change the pre-existing social and economic system. Another 
British liberal feminist, Radcliffe suggests that feminists demanded for women 
the rights and opportunities equal to those of men not as a result of the 
development of liberalism but because liberalism was not yet sufficiently 
developed.7) From this perspective, equality within a status quo would mean to 
eliminate arbitrarily disadvantageous treatments of women in all spheres of 
society. To Radcliff, liberalism and difference feminism are quite compatible in 
order to achieve substantial equality between the two sexes. 
 Socialist feminism is concerned with two types of differences; sex and 
race. Over the last two decades, socialist feminism underwent three major 
changes: 1) from androgyny to gender difference, 2) from Marxism to 
reformism within the current system, 3) increased focus on difference between 
groups instead of class.8) In the prevailing neo-liberal intellectual framework, 
the notion of equality for socialist feminism changed from the abolition of all 
kinds of oppression to a semi-pluralist notion of political inﬂuence.9)
 Iris Young represents such socialist feminists. Although she cautions 
against the danger of revaluing of womankind, she sees female values as a 
potential source for good which should be applicable to the public as well as 
private spheres. However, unlike cultural feminists, Young is also sensitive to 
the fact that women’s cultural differences go hand in hand with social 
inequalities.10) She thinks that the politics of group representation is most 
suitable to rectify political inequalities between the privileged and the 
underprivileged and proposes institutional mechanisms reserved for minority 
groups including women and blacks. Theses mechanisms consist mainly of 
three factors: First, self-organization of group members, second, voicing a 
group’s analysis of how social policy proposals affect them and generating 
policy proposals in institutionalized contexts, third, having veto power 
regarding speciﬁc policies that would affect a group directly.11)
 However, problems remain. Since her notion of groups is that they are 
fluid, based upon affinity and separation, ‘most people have multiple group 
identifications’ as she herself admitted.12) Can institutional mechanisms cope 
with such fluidity? Since we could imagine an unlimited number of minority 
groups such as women, black women and old black women, retired black 
women, battered black women….who establishes which groups are ‘politically 
correct’? Furthermore, since a group is by deﬁnition ‘homogenous’, differences 
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within groups would be eventually eliminated. With regards to women’s groups, 
Anne Phillips points out that women are not a minority group, numerically 
constituting the half of the population.13) Furthermore, it is open to question 
that women’s groups can represent the interests of all women at a time when 
there are no issues unifying women such as abortion rights and rights to vote as 
was the case in the 1970s. 
 The third difference is a post-modern denial of the notion of a ﬁxed self 
inherent to theories of modernization. Although this main premise of post-
modernism emphasizes that a unitary, white and rational man is no more 
history’s subject, making visible difference minority groups, it denies the 
existence of any unitary subject. While the former is a favorable discovery for 
feminists, the latter seems almost self-destructive to them since even the 
concept of women is questioned in the end. 
 As a post-modern feminist, Judith Butler declares that ‘a doer creates a 
deed and a deed creates a doer.’14) There is no pre-existing I, but the I who 
perform. What feminist politics is possible when categories of subjects are 
reduced to ‘performers’ who exist only as a result of repeating a set of meanings 
already socially established? According to her schema, gender becomes a 
stylized repetition of acts.15) To subvert the patriarchal order would consist of a 
failure to repeat, a de-formity of cultural norms inscribed upon the body. 
Cultural practices of drag, cross-dressing, and the butch/femme identities can 
be effective to demonstrate the very contingency in the relation between sex 
and gender.16) The ultimate overthrowing act would then be ‘lesbianism’ which 
subverts compulsory heterosexuality as a political order.
 Despite pertinent arguments about gender injustice, post-modern 
feminism poses problems especially on the political front. When there is no 
fixed self, how can the interest of each and every one of us be represented 
politically? From this point of view, Butler’s idea to destabilize patriarchy 
through subversion of one’s fixed identity is a strong criticism but is not 
politically tenable. More generally, post-modernism makes light of our material 
reality since it is undeniable that a self equipped with his or her body has a 
certain mental coherence. For example, by denying the category of women, can 
post-modern feminists forget the reality of what their predecessors had 
achieved in terms of women’s political rights over the last two hundred years?
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(2) Difference feminism was trapped in a sameness/difference dilemma. 
 Despite their common recognition of women’s difference from men as a 
basic posture to advance women’s rights, two main themes divide difference 
feminists of the 90s. The ﬁrst is on the category of women and the second, on 
the cause of femaleness. 
 Can a category of women be generalized? Post-modern feminists and 
certain black feminists think that there is no such category as ‘women’ as 
opposed to other feminists who think that woman is indeed an identical 
category. Okin, however, comparing the situation of women of the Western 
culture and those of the Third World rejected the idea that Western feminist 
political theories served only white middle-class women.17) By comparing 
women of the Western culture and those of the Third World in light of feminist 
political theories and developmental theories, she concluded that gender was a 
universal category of analysis and Western feminist political theories were also 
applicable to women across different cultural and social settings.18) If any 
woman’s any experience is generally and universally useful as was stated by 
Okin, the question to ask would be then what provoked a fragmentation of 
female identity among various feminist schools. To answer this question, it is 
necessary to refer to the nature of post-modernism. 
 Alain Touraine stated that modernity affirmed that from a historical 
point of view, the progress of rationality and technique had a double objective: 
The first was to fight against nature and feudal customs. The second was to 
create a new culture based upon pleasure, emotions and the intelligence of 
each individual.19) This optimistic image of a productive, free and happy modern 
world broke down when there was a dislocation among economic growth, 
political freedom and individual liberty during the twentieth-century. If 
economy does not depend upon Protestant ethics nor the sense of devotion for 
the country but the instrumental rationality to increase market shares, culture 
is no more a result of rationalization and consequently cut off from History and 
universalism inherent to the modernization theories.20) As a result, this 
dislocation brought about two separate ideological currencies by the end of the 
twentieth-century; libertarians and communitarians: libertarians adopt 
instrumental rationality appropriate to participate in the free market economy 
whereas communitarians claim the recognition of their cultural differences in 
51
the economic context of globalization. 
 In a sense, the fragmentation of feminists represents a communitarian 
current. While it is important for particular cultural groups to claim their 
identity that had been oppressed, their uncompromising attitudes to ‘others’ 
manifested for example by strong cultural feminism and black feminism can 
become another form of racism and intolerance. Furthermore, those who 
abandon universal principles such as strong cultural feminism and post-
modernism are relativists and speak only for themselves. Values are not about 
what they are but what things should be.  From this  perspective, 
communitarianism which rejects ‘universalism’ misses its object. 
 The second division is between strong cultural feminists who celebrate 
innate womanly nature as opposed to others who think female virtues result 
from socialization. Strong cultural feminists’ isolation is politically dangerous 
since by afﬁrming their innate female nature, their argument could be utilized 
by conservatives to justify women’s traditional subordinate roles in society. 
 On the legal front, the afﬁrmation of ‘sexual difference’ turned out to be 
disastrous for feminists. For example, the ‘Sears’ case, the sex-discrimination 
suit brought against the Sears by the Equal Employment opportunity 
Commission in 1978 constituted a clash between ‘sameness’ feminists and 
‘difference’ feminists. In contrast, while a sameness feminist historian cited 
historical examples to prove that women’s behaviors are not able to be 
generalized in terms of job seeking and men and women might have identical 
interests,21) a difference feminist historian testified that ‘fundamental 
differences’ between the two sexes, the result of culture or long-standing 
patterns of socialization, led to women’s lack of interest in commission sales 
jobs.22) As a result, the difference argument justiﬁed job discrimination practices 
against women in the name of ‘natural’ difference, fitting in with the logic of 
Reagan’s conservatism. Maternity leave was another issue of controversy 
between sameness feminists who deny any right to leave and job security and 
difference feminists who assimilate such guarantees under a gender-neutral 
category of disability.23)
 These two examples point at the inadequacy of sameness/difference 
paradigm to achieve substantial equality between the two sexes: Discussions 
on gender-neutral (sameness) and gender-specific (difference) laws in the 
United States indicate that they lead either to a double-burden of work and 
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family for women or to an exclusion of women from the job market. This is 
because the sameness/difference dichotomy refers to the norm of the citizen 
who is, in fact, a white, middle-class, and male adult.24) On this aspect, Bacchi 
points out that ‘the debates distract attention from deeper political issues such 
as the relationship between personal life and work commitments and the way 
in which Western industrial societies privilege competition and downgrade 
caring.’25) As a result, how to deﬁne a more ﬂexible concept of citizenship has 
become a feminist task to achieve substantial equality between the two sexes. 
(3) Feminists’ criticism against male-biased universal citizenship
 What citizenship would then allow for women’s equality with men while 
at the same time, recognizing their differences? Since there are differences at 
least in terms of reproduction between the two sexes, only attending to such 
differences can enable the inclusion of women’s speciﬁcity in the discussion on 
political equality among citizens. From this perspective, difference feminists 
attacked the traditional morality based upon ‘transcendental reason’. According 
to the table of opposition by Pythagorus, limit/unlimit implies that to be male 
(limit) is to be a bearer of form, order or structure and to be female (unlimit) is 
to be devoid of these.26) This argument suggests that femininity is a negative 
condition, the intermediate state from which a determinate human identity 
emerges, implying reproduction of males.27)
 Moreover, the association of the female principle with the formlessness 
indicates that female souls do not fully exhibit the logos (reason), necessary to 
participate in the public life.28) This, in turn, implies that because women’s 
existence is limited to the private sphere, the female mind should be multiple 
and unstable without a finite personality.29) These basic premises were taken 
over by Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke and Rousseau who allocated to 
women a dependent legal status upon their husbands within a household. 
 Kant also concluded that women were morally inferior to men because 
they were focused on the particular and therefore inaccessible to reason.30) He 
associated women with feeling and wrote: ‘No moral principle is based on any 
feeling whatsoever. For feeling….always belongs to the order of Nature.’31) In 
contrast, according to Kant, ‘transcendental reason’ (logos) served as a basis 
for male rationality and sense of justice and justiﬁed men’s participation in the 
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public sphere. The split between society and nature on the one hand and reason 
and feeling on the other that legitimized women’s subordinate social status was 
particularly inﬂuential upon twentieth-century liberal political thinkers such as 
John Rawls.32)
 As a representative thinker of difference feminism, Gilligan launched an 
ultimate criticism against this exclusively male nature of ‘transcendental 
reason’ by proposing a female-centred ethics. Based upon Chodorow’s theory, 
Gilligan suggests that gender socialisation produces two different notions of 
morality: men’s separation from their mothers gives them an ethics of justice 
based upon rights while women’s afﬁliation to mothers gives them an ethics of 
care which consists of emphasis (stressing the value of), consequence 
(calculating the effects on others),  and context (assessing social 
circumstances).33)
 Gilligan addressed criticism against Kohlberg’s moral development scale 
based on the traditional dichotomy between male logos and female emotions. 
In fact, studies using his scale revealed sexual differences (male superiority) in 
the level of moral reasoning in line with the Western philosophical tradition.34) 
Gilligan suggests that these results were unfounded since the research 
paradigm implicitly adopted male life as the norm and tried to fashion women 
out of masculine cloth. Instead of patriarchal values, she afﬁrmed instead that 
care and responsibility within personal relationships constituted a distinct 
morality of femininity and genuinely distinct from impartiality often associated 
with masculinity.35)
 Similarly, Young afﬁrmed that there were observed differences between 
masculine and feminine body comportment due to a particular social formation 
during a particular epoch. For example, she pointed out that the way a girl and 
a boy throw differs.36) Assuming that feminine ways of moving body defines 
women’s subjectivity, Young concluded that Beauvoir’s account of woman’s 
existence deﬁned by a basic tension between immanence (society deﬁnes her 
the other) and transcendence (women is also a free subject) was also reﬂected 
in her relation to space.37) In particular, since a woman tends to live her body as 
a thing, she remains rooted in immanence, is inhibited, and retains a distance 
from her body as transcending movement and from commitment to the worldly 
possibilities.38) Such ‘femininity’ however is largely determined by the 
patriarchal nature inherent to Western society which confines women to be 
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physically inhibited, confined and objectified.39) A lack of physical practices, 
fear of visibility and threat of bodily invasion therefore confines her space, 
inhibiting her existence as a free subject.40)
 As a result of these reﬂections, Young thinks that women’s differences 
from men should be emphasised and respected as such. However, the 
traditional notion of universal citizenship mirroring the interests of dominant 
groups does not accommodate these particular differences inherent to women 
since the ideal of the public realm of citizenship as expressing a general will 
which transcends differences of citizens operates as a demand for homogeneity 
among citizens.41) Therefore, it suppresses particular interests of minority 
groups such as the speciﬁcity of women’s bodies and desire and the difference 
of race and culture…42) Her proposal was then to reach ‘dialogic reason’ which 
transcends this dichotomy between impartial and particular. As long as the 
dialogue allows all perspectives to speak freely, and be heard through the 
institutional mechanism I mentioned earlier, the expression of need, motive 
and feelings will not have merely private significance and will not bias nor 
distort the conclusions because they will interact with other need, motives and 
feelings.43)
 I suggest that Young’s idea seems problematic on a number of fronts. 
Firstly, is liberal politics a mere instrument to increase particular interests of 
some groups? Such an interpretation of liberalism based upon the theory of 
‘rational choice’ seems rather rooted in American political culture. Other 
visions of liberalism are perceptible in the British and European liberal 
traditions. A representative reactionary thinker of the French Revolution, 
Burke was strongly opposed to a dichotomy between feeling and reason, the 
idea that was also adopted by early French liberals such as Mme de Staël, B. 
Constant and A. de Tocqueville. Another nineteenth-century British liberal, 
J.S.Mill stressed that liberalism enriched individual differences that were not 
selfish. He wrote; ‘to be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others 
develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their 
object. The better development of the social part of his nature is rendered 
possible by the restraint put upon the selﬁsh part.’44)
 Secondly, her ‘dialogic reason’ does not seem different from the notion 
of impartiality. While admitting that Kant’s notion of impartiality is rather rigid, 
Mills’ description of the ‘public mind’ mentioned above does not oppose reason 
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to feeling. Is there a dichotomy between reason and feeling, male and female 
moral disposition or universalism and particularism?
(4) Towards a gender-neutral concept of citizenship and democracy
 In line with some nineteenth-century liberals, Okin refuses to split 
reason and feeling and proposes an alternative view of morality by revising as 
well as relying on Rawl’s ‘theory of justice’. It is well-known that Rawls 
developed a political theory based upon individual freedom as well as on 
substantial equality among individuals. His originality to ensure this double 
combination derives from two elements that characterized his political and 
moral theory ; the first is his notion of the ‘original position’:the parties are 
rational and mutually disinterested and while no limits are placed on the 
general information available to them, they deliberate behind a veil of ignorance 
that conceals from them all knowledge of their individual characteristics. 
Nobody knows his place in society and individuals are given primary goods, 
basic liberties and goods that are prerequisites for the pursuit of distinct ends 
and interests that they are unaware of. The second is the principle of difference, 
the principle that directs our attention to the worst that can happen under any 
proposed course of action and to decide in light of this.45)
 As Rawls wrote, ‘the combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of 
ignorance achieve the same purpose as benevolence.’46) This combination of 
conditions forces each person in the original position to take the good of others 
into account. It implies that to practice this moral disposition, individuals are 
required of both strong empathy and a preparedness to listen carefully to very 
different points of views of others. Consequently, Okin underlines that the 
original position supposes not a Kantian type of abstract morality but is open to 
an appreciation and concern for concrete social and other human differences 
and that we must think from the position of everybody, in the sense of each in 
turn.47) In other words, individuals should turn to both feeling and reason in 
order to dispose of an altruistic moral disposition at the original position. If we 
include in the list of things unknown by a person at the original position the 
category of ‘sex’, men and women at the original position are forced to question 
gender customs from all points of view, including that of women. 
 Consequently, Okin suggests that such a morality refutes the gender-
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biased dichotomy between care and justice on the one hand and between 
particularism and universalism on the other but still serves as a moral basis for 
a ﬂexible moral base for citizenship. This ﬂexible moral disposition should be 
encouraged in society at large to ensure such a gender-neutral society. But how 
do we promote such morality? Okin thinks this question should be relocated 
within Rawl’s theory of justice, theory concerned with the question of how, 
whether and to what extent beginnings should affect outcomes.
 Society divides us into two distinct groups, men and women from an 
early stage of life and this gender distinction as an organizing principle of 
society affects the course of our whole life. Young and Gilligan propose that 
women should afﬁrm their ‘differences’ from men in order to achieve equality 
between the two sexes. But does this really help rectify gender injustice? Since 
sexual differences result from socialization and mothering in particular, their 
proposition runs the risk of preserving actual sexual inadequacies without 
questioning gender injustice rooted in the family structure. Therefore, a 
substantial justice between the sexes should question the family institution as 
the very source of perpetuating gender injustice. In other words, in order for 
individuals to develop their potential to become free persons, social justice 
requires that gender not be the cause that might affect our life. How would it be 
possible?
 Rawls thinks that the family is the ﬁrst school of moral development in 
line with Rousseau, Hegel and Tocqueville. Since he values ‘self-esteem’ as the 
most important of the primary goods at the original position, it implies that he 
attributes a fundamental importance of loving parenting for the development of 
a sense of justice and recognized the political importance of family for 
nurturing the sense of citizenship. However, he does not mention internal 
justice within the family which, as we have seen, constitutes the ‘private’ root 
of gender injustice in society at large. In other words, since Rawls assumes that 
individuals are male heads of the household, other members’ well-being 
depends upon men’s discretion, which makes Rawl’s theory of justice less 
justifiable from the point of view of our contemporary vision of individual 
rights.
 This is why ‘justice’ should be applicable to the family institution itself 
since there are situations where justice is a crucial virtue in the family 
composed of individuals whose interests conﬂict with one another (domestic 
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violence, marital rapes are good examples). Furthermore, how could children 
develop a sense of justice in the face of gender inequalities between the two 
parents? A real gender-neutral society would be possible only if we established 
a gender-neutral family that might be possible only if sex is unknown at the 
original position and difference principles are applied inside the family 
institution. 
 Rawl’s main principle, justiﬁed inequalities both to the greatest beneﬁt of 
the least advantaged and attached to ofﬁces and positions open to all ensures 
that there is no linkage between one’s sex and current gender division of labor 
within the family. As a result, men as well as women who put themselves in the 
shoes of women at the original position go further than the formal legal equality 
of the sexes bringing about substantial justice in line with the principle of 
benefiting the least advantaged. Only then does the sex become a morally 
irrelevant item in society.
Conclusion
 This essay has examined what difference feminism entails in terms of 
moral and political implication. I have suggested that although a naïve appraisal 
of female virtue might be detrimental to feminists’ cause in so far as it runs the 
risk of being complicit with patriarchal social values, difference feminism 
nonetheless constitutes a powerful challenge to traditional moral and political 
theories. I have also demonstrated that difference feminists such as Gilligan 
and Young pointed out that sexual differences resulted from socialization and 
that the traditional political morality based upon abstract reason could not 
cope with these differences. In contrast, Okin proposes a new morality 
irrespective of gender based upon empathy and benevolence as a moral basis of 
citizenship. The idea derives from Rawl’s sense of justice: those in the original 
position must think from the perspective of everybody which requires strong 
empathy to others (the particular) and transcendental reasoning (the 
universal).
 If we conclude sex in the characteristics (the veil of ignorance) that 
individuals are supposed not to know in the original position and apply Rawl’s 
principle of difference to family institutions, then, families as a source of 
perpetuating sexual division of labor would be replaced by families that would 
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take into account the potential of each individual irrespective of gender. 
Finally, such a democratic family would serve as a basic unit to form a truly 
democratic society. 
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